Conversations Within the Divided Self: A Conceptual Metaphor Analysis of Internal Family Systems Theory
Conversations Within the Divided Self: A Conceptual Metaphor Analysis of Internal Family Systems Theory
Abstract
This paper will demonstrate how Schwartz’s psychological theory, “The Internal Family Systems Model," is an elaboration of Lakoff’s conceptual metaphor, “The Divided Person.” I will propose that IFS is intuitive because it is an elaboration of our current metaphorical conception of self--and that where it differs structurally is in replacing the binary, or hierarchical aspects of our current model--resulting in a more compassionate self-conception. This paper contributes to an existing body of research on the conceptual structure of psychological theories, and argues that understanding the differences between them is crucial: each metaphorical elaboration comes with different inferences, leading to real-world consequences in patients’ lives.
I. Introduction
Since its development in the late 70s and early 80s, Conceptual Metaphor Theory has increasingly influenced research in multiple fields including linguistics, cognitive science, and psychology, and there is a general sense that we have only scratched the surface of its interdisciplinary value (Bichisecchi & Bolognesi, 2014, p. 4). In the introduction to the fifth edition of the Journal of Cognitive Semiotics, researchers Fusaroli and Morgagni explicitly called for “more extensive integration of CMT into a complex framework of social and cognitive dynamics,” echoing a current trend in the field (2013, p. 5). This paper aims to address that need by analyzing the metaphorical structure of a groundbreaking psychological theory which has grown in popularity over the last decade: the Internal Family Systems Model.
This paper will propose that the IFS Model is intuitive because it is an elaboration of the metaphorical framework we already use to conceptualize the self, as demonstrated in Lakoff’s “The Divided Person Metaphor.” But the IFS elaboration fosters a more compassionate self-conception, one that is accepting of even aspects of the self that are often considered negative or undesirable. IFS allows us to become aware of and even dialogue with the parts of our personality that fractured off and became relegated to the subconscious as a result of trauma--in a sense, reuniting our “divided selves.”
II. Literature Review
A. Introduction to Conceptual Metaphor Theory
The basic premise of CMT is that “metaphor,” though often thought of as solely a poetic or literary device, is actually the mechanism that underlies all of our thoughts and actions (Lakoff & Johnson 1980, p. 3). Evidence for this deep metaphorical structure can be found in our everyday language. Lakoff particularly has mapped out many of these common metaphors, presenting evidence of their ubiquity through ample relevant linguistic expressions. The most oft-cited, classic example is the metaphor ARGUMENT IS WAR. It is illustrated in expressions such as “your claims are indefensible,” “I demolished his argument,” and “I’ve never won an argument with him” (p. 4). In expressions like this one, we understand one, more abstract domain of experience (in this case “argument”), in terms of a more concrete, or embodied one (in this case “war”). The metaphor is realized by the ontological mapping of concepts from the target (or abstract) domain onto the source (or concrete) one. In this case “the arguers” correspond “to warriors”, “shots taken” correspond to “provocative or inflammatory comments”, and so on. We can see that the metaphor runs deeper than the lexical level, since we “don’t only talk about arguments in terms of war...we can actually win or lose [them]...[and] we see the person we are arguing with as an opponent” (p. 4). The metaphor can even be embodied, if a person’s physical demeanor is affected by their “feeling wounded” as a result of a fight. These patterns illustrate the way we conceive of an argument, pre-linguistically.
The metaphors around argumentation are just one example of how Conceptual Metaphor can provide an inroad to understanding human interaction and relationship dynamics. For this reason, CMT has increasingly been used in psychological research over the last few decades--though integration has been slow. Lakoff explains the reasons for this in a 1997 paper, writing about the “unfortunate” disjointment between psychotherapy and cognitive science. This rift, he says, exists because researchers in these fields falsely believe that they deal with disparate subject matter: psychotherapists with pathology, and cognitive scientists with the routine workings of the mind.
Crucially, these different perspectives affect how the two fields conceive of the unconscious mind. Psychotherapists have tended to imagine the unconscious mind in Freudian terms--that is, a collection of “hypercharged”, repressed thoughts that can potentially be made conscious through therapy (1997, p. 90). But cognitive science conceives of it more generally as “the mechanism of thought,” which “need not be highly charged at all,” and is not, by nature, repressed. It simply composes the “automatic” and “most commonplace” aspects of our conceptual system. He goes on to suggest however that this is a false paradigm, since certain mechanisms identified in the Freudian unconscious are paralleled in the cognitive unconscious: “symbolization” parallels conceptual metaphor, “displacement” parallels “conceptual metonymy,” “condensation” parallels “conceptual blending,” etc. The main incongruity between these theories then, is that though they each identify similar mental mechanisms, Freud saw them as “irrational modes of primary process thinking” and cognitive scientists assert that they are “an indispensable part of ordinary, rational thought, which is largely unconscious” (p. 90).
In his 1997 paper, Lakoff does not speak to whether “repression” is considered a valid phenomenon from a cognitive perspective or not, but he does mention that “if Freud was right [and it does exist,]...then the use of the conscious metaphor system in dreams is a perfect way for the unconscious mind to hide thoughts from the conscious mind while nonetheless thinking them” (p.106). By examining a few case studies, Lakoff demonstrates how dreams show evidence of the same general system of metaphorical thought that he and Kovecses have shown to govern our everyday (waking) lives (p. 91)--and moreover, how CMT can explain why reliable tropes can be found in dreams, and why standard or “normal” interpretations of them can exist (p. 105). This is because the imagery used in dreams is constrained by the general metaphors at what is called the “superordinate level” (ie LOVE IS A JOURNEY), but then realized in images from the “subordinate level” (ie images of “a car, roads, bridges, bad weather, and so forth”) (p. 106). Considered in tandem with unique knowledge about each individual dreamer, Lakoff contends that an explicit knowledge of the metaphorical system (that we as English speakers already use) can be a useful clinical tool. Lakoff concludes by expanding the scope of this assertion beyond dream analysis to all of psychotherapy, since “people can believe their metaphors and live according to them” (p. 119).
Modern linguists and psychoanalysts like Bolognesi and Bicisecchi (2014) and Terry Eynon (2002) build upon this work, using Conceptual Metaphor as just one tool in an interdisciplinary approach to analyzing patients’ dreams. Like Lakoff, they recognize the subconscious, experiential bases of conceptual metaphors that show up in dreams and elsewhere--while also validating their deep roots in “personal, interpersonal, and cultural dynamics” (p. 5). For this reason, these researchers and others are part of the gradually building movement to integrate CMT more extensively “into a complex framework of social and cognitive dynamics” (Fusaroli and Morgagni (2013), as cited in Bolognesi and Bicisecchi, 2014, p. 5). For example, Marco Casonato (2003) analyzes his clients’ metaphors against a control group, observing parallels like “BULIMIA IS A GAME” and “FASTING IS LOVE” to “EATING IS A GAME” and “EATING IS LOVE” (as cited in Bolognesi and Bicisecchi, 2014, p. 6).
Perhaps because Conceptual Metaphor Theory “provides a natural mechanism for relating concrete images to abstract meanings” (Lakoff, 1997, p. 104), it has “long been of interest to many schools of psychotherapy...with numerous potential benefits asserted” (F. Mathesion et al, 2018). In the realm of Cognitive Behavioral Therapy (CBT) specifically, there has been a growing interest in using it in therapy, considering both “the need for attention to client metaphors” and “the therapist’s use of metaphor” (p. 2). Though it is the first of its kind in the literature, F. Mathesion et al.’s 2018 study demonstrates that training experienced therapists in the use and identification of metaphor may effectively help clients feel understood, strengthening their connection to the clinician. The therapists who participated in the training maintained that their clients seemed to “feel heard” when clinicians picked up on their metaphors (p. 10), and researchers concluded, quoting Elliot et al. 1992, that an intentional use of metaphors may ultimately “be effective in helping to change clients’ distorted views” (p. 1).
Conceptual Metaphor Theory has even been useful in designing studies for schizophrenia research. In B. Elvevåg et al. (2011), researchers used Conceptual Metaphors from Kovecses (2011) to study “what aspect of semantics accounts for the unusual speech and comprehension deficits in schizophrenia” (p. 206). In both examination of their free speech and in a priming experiment, it was found that schizophrenic patients were more likely to interpret metaphors literally than the control group. Researchers were able to use these findings to support the theory that schizophrenic delusions may essentially be literal interpretations of Conceptual Metaphors and their elaborations. In other words, “figurative thinking in the ‘pre-delusional period’ may pave the foundation for later delusions” (p. 206). To use an example these researchers cited from Rhodes and Jakes (2004): “at some stage, thoughts such as ‘I am like someone possessed by a devil’ become ‘I am possessed by a devil’” (p. 206).
B. Introduction to “The Divided Person Metaphor”
The Conceptual Metaphor most relevant to our discussion of inner plurality is The Divided Person Metaphor. It was developed as a model for conceptualizing the self around the time that “non-cognitively oriented theories of semantics” were being disproved (Lakoff, 1996, p. 92). Lakoff explains how this evolution was catalyzed by a few key linguistic phenomena. In the era of generative semantics, for example, it was a widely-held contention that first-person pronouns like “I, me, and myself” will always refer to the same person, the speaker of the sentence (p. 92). The flaw in this logic was famously elucidated by a few examples, one of which being the counterfactuals exhibited in 1.1 and 1.2 below:
1.1 If I were you, I’d hate me.
1.2 If I were you, I’d hate myself. (p. 91)
Since these sentences mean different things, it became clear that a deeper explanation was necessary. Lakoff ultimately concluded that to understand such cases where reflexive pronouns fail to indicate identity of reference, “we must be able to conceptualize a person as having two parts: the Subject and the Self” (p. 93). The Subject is essentially “the locus of subjective experience, [including] consciousness, perception, judgement, will, and capacity to feel” (p. 93). The Self, by contrast, is “the part of us that acts in the world” like our bodies, emotions, and cultural beliefs (p. 93). Together these claims are known as The Divided Person Metaphor. It is a “superordinate” metaphor, meaning it “forms the basis for a whole system of other metaphors” (p. 99). One of these, The Projected-Subject Metaphor, helps us interpret 1.1 and 1.2 as the Subject-of-I being projected onto the Subject-of-You in a hypothetical situation.
Looking at various linguistic expressions, Lakoff and Becker (1991) point to some of the more nuanced layers of the “The Divided Person Metaphor,” demonstrating the related system of sub-metaphors we use to conceptualize the self in English. Consider 1.3 - 1.7 below.
1.3 I lost myself in writing.
1.4 I found myself in writing.
1.5 You need to step outside yourself.
1.6 I’m beside myself.
1.7 I’m not myself today. (Lakoff, 1996, p. 99)
The examples 1.3 and 1.4 are telling because lost and found are opposites, yet these expressions do not have opposite meanings. Similarly, the prepositional phrases in 1.5 - 1.6 indicate that some properties of the “physical senses of those words” are being mapped onto a more abstract domain. All of these examples allude to the presence of a rich system of metaphors at work in our conceptualization of a person’s “inner structure” (p. 100). Crucially, 1.7’s phrase “I’m not myself today” does not mean “X is not X.” Rather, it implies that there are two different aspects of the same entity that are distinct--two contrasting incarnations of Self. In fact, Lakoff has demonstrated evidence of “various kinds of Subject/ Self divisions,” and of our tendency to conceptualize them as “external individuals.” Problematically though, these divisions are often inconsistent with one other, and don’t seem to “fit together into a simple general scheme” (p. 100). It is the primary goal of the present paper, to demonstrate how The Internal Family Systems Model can in a sense, resolve this issue: offering a framework that accounts for our internal inconsistencies, and even suggests some methods to unify or otherwise harmonize them.
C. The Data: Internal Family Systems Model (IFS)
Intro to IFS
The “Internal Family Systems Model” (IFS) is a metaphorical conception of the self that drew inspiration from literal (external) “family systems therapy.” For the purpose of this paper, we can think of this psychological theory itself as the data that we are using conceptual metaphor to analyze. IFS Founder, Dr. Richard Schwartz, was a practicing family therapist who followed Minuchin and other externally-based psychologists of his time in the early 1970’s. They were some of the first to introduce “systems thinking”--a concept that originated in organismic biology around the same time--to therapy. He mainly worked with troubled adolescents, treating them by reframing their psychological issues and behavior symptoms as reactions to issues in the larger family dynamic, often trying to “protect” the parents from dealing with their failed marriages (Schwartz 2020, p. 6).
Inspired by Bowen and Satir, Schwartz wrote his dissertation on improving communication between couples in order to improve individual self-esteem (p. 8-9). Though the strategy initially seemed effective, the follow-up to the study showed that the couples had not retained a higher sense of self-esteem (p. 8). When Schwartz got hired at the Institute for Juvenile Research (IJR) in Chicago, he learned about a newly diagnosed disorder called “bulimia,” and felt inspired to use this population to test (and he predicted) to prove the efficacy of family systems therapy. But when some clients’ bulimic symptoms persisted even after the family had been “reorganized,” Schwartz began to doubt the effectiveness of the externally-focused family systems approach as a sole provider of healing (p. 9).
2. Inner Parts
Driven by his frustration in working with a treatment-resistant patient named Quinn, Schwartz stepped outside the theoretical model of family systems therapy and asked her about her inner experience, and what was occurring there that kept driving her to binge and purge (p. 10). Quinn responded by describing “warring parts” in her mind: seemingly autonomous voices that “talked back, said funny things, and were willing to cite their motives” (p. 10). This discovery held major implications for the field of psychology which, in the 20th century, viewed the phenomenon of “psychic multiplicity” as pathological--and in which professionals often used singular adjectives (“needy, hostile, nurturing” etc), to describe patients. Working with Quinn and other young women with eating disorders, Schwartz slowly assimilated the idea that “although our limited vocabulary for distinguishing among inner entities (at least in English) blocks us from being aware of the activity of this inner community” it is still very much a constant, active presence (p. 11). As he continued working with his patients’ inner parts, he found that these inner families displayed some of the same issues external ones, particularly in terms of “leadership problems” (p. 15).
3. Parts as “Inner People”
Schwartz contends that though parts can be identified by certain labels as to how they present in a given instance, (ie “the sad part, the angry part, the caretaker” etc), one label, one emotion, or even one “habitual thought pattern” does not capture their true essence (p. 30). Parts should be understood as “discrete, autonomous mental systems,” that have individual goals, challenges, strengths, and beliefs about the world. Like a “caretaking child” or “an angry rebel” in an external, alcoholic family, different inner parts can be “forced into extreme [maladaptive] roles that they don’t want” for the survival of the system (p. 31).
According to Schwartz, these parts take on roles that can be categorized into three general archetypes: managers, exiles, and firefighters. Managers are “highly protective, strategic, and interested in controlling the environment to keep things safe” (p. 31). Managers suppress or hide the parts that feel “injured” or “outraged” for the good of the system, and these are called “exiles.” Exiles are often young; an inner personality with the innocence and temperament of a child, lacking the capacity to process the trauma they are experiencing. To protect, “stifle, anesthetize, or distract from the feelings of exiles” are the firefighters (p. 31). Though they have the same ultimate goal as managers, “to keep exiles out of mind,” firefighters use very different tactics, often including “numbing activities like self-mutilation, binge eating, drug or alcohol abuse, dissociation, and sexual risk taking” (p. 35). They often overtake a person thoroughly, without concern for distress they may cause to other parts of the system. Because of this, the protective parts (managers and firefighters) are often at odds--and “the more an exile is suppressed, the more it tries to break out,” perpetuating an unhealthy cycle (p. 31).
Schwartz observed that these dysfunctional relationship dynamics mirrored those found in (external) Family Systems Therapy (“triangulation,” “scapegoating,” etc), and began trying to help them improve their communication (p. 15). This proved to be a difficult feat. Even engaging in noncoercive dialogue with one part at a time was a challenge, since other parts often interrupted, escalating the conflict (p. 16). Familiar with this dynamic from working with (external) families, Schwartz developed a method of asking the interfering parts to “step back” so that the desired part or parts had a chance to speak. It was engaging in this process with a patient named Cora that he first discovered the open, compassionate, “true self” lying in wait behind all the others. This part, which he began to call the “Self” with a capital “S,” was the essence of each patient’s inner leader. To Schwartz’s surprise, all of his patients demonstrated the presence of a “Self” part, and in each case that part seemed naturally equipped with an innate sense of calmness, confidence, creativity, and healing (p. 17-18).
III. Analysis of Conceptual Shifts IFS Inspires to the Metaphorical Understanding of the Self in English
A. Normalizing Inner Plurality
Schwartz discovered that despite psychotherapy’s history of considering “inner parts” to be pathological, they are actually ubiquitous, and subsequently, working with them is very intuitive. This makes sense from a cognitive linguistic perspective, in which the Internal Family Systems Model may be seen as an elaboration of the metaphorical system we already have. The focus of this paper will now turn to demonstrating how the IFS Model is conceptually structured through The Divided Person Metaphor, and how this particular elaboration allows us to reason about the self in a way different from standard, everyday understandings--resulting in a more compassionate self-conception.
For example, Lakoff contends that based on the Divided Person Metaphor, “Normal functioning is non self-conscious and controlled with no internal incompatibilities” (1996: 101). IFS holds that there is always a system of inner entities, and incompatibilities are normal--a more unified feeling of consciousness occurs when the parts are working cohesively. Essentially, IFS teaches us that optimal functioning is a result of our inner parts in a state of harmony and appropriate hierarchies. Beyond normalizing inner plurality, IFS teaches us to understand how our “incompatibilities'' are actually evidence of our psyche trying to protect itself. Schwartz would say that this concept can be difficult to grasp, precisely because our different parts will disagree on the best method of self-protection--and because different parts manifest at different levels of consciousness in each moment. The personification of inner parts is a crucial aspect of IFS’s elaboration of The Divided Person: because our inner parts are perceived as somewhat autonomous “people,” we are able to conceive of a rich variety of interactions among them. Within this richness we find space to reimagine our everyday conceptions of ourselves, and find healing.
B. Reimagining the “Rationality vs. Emotions” Binary
The Divided Person and the Objective Subject
Consider example 1.8 below.
1.8 “He took a long, hard look at himself”
This expression represents our attempt to see ourselves as others see us, conceptually splitting ourselves in two (Lakoff, 1996, p. 102). To review, Lakoff explains this divide as:
The Subject: Locus of consciousness/ rationality/ subjective experience
The Self: Our bodies / emotions / the part of us that acts in the world
It is telling that “rationality” is considered coupled with conscious awareness, while “emotions” are considered separate. Lakoff writes that this conception is shaped by a strong cultural belief that “the Subject, our locus of consciousness and reason, should be in control of our Self, so that our desires and passions do not get out of hand and lead us to harm others” (p. 102). This binary view that emotions and rationality cannot exist together, is indicative of a certain disconnected nature of the self in western culture. IFS reframes this idea in the sense that the “open and curious” part is considered the true and most central self, but its job is not to control the other inner parts as much as it is to listen to, lead, and work with them. Though they may perform maladaptive coping mechanisms before therapy is introduced, the parts are not inherently good or bad--they are simply balanced or unbalanced, and can function within a gradient of helpful to hurtful (Schwartz, 2020).
Lakoff notes that our culture also tells us that “there is a singular way we ‘really are,’ and an objective viewpoint from which we could see it, if only we could ‘get there’” (p. 102).
While the IFS Model does acknowledge the “open and curious” inner part as the “true Self,” it emphasizes that each of the inner archetypes are necessary components of the self-system. Each part is seen as having its own, completely valid, subjective experience, and these parts can interact with one another and/or the outside world.
2. The Objective-Subject Metaphor
The mapping of this metaphor contends that:
The Self is a container for the Subject
Being subjective is staying inside the Self
Being objective is going outside the Self
This mapping combines with the metaphor “Knowing is Seeing,” to create the source domain knowledge that “when one is inside a container one cannot see the outside of the container, the part that outsiders see. One is normally inside, and going outside takes more effort and more control than staying inside” (p. 103). The IFS Model proposes a different spatial conception: the various parts are asked to “step aside”--almost like removing layers--and at some point uncover the “true Self” (“open and curious” part). This process is an elaboration of the concept of “removing the ‘Subject’ from the container”. Parts can also “step forward” when it is their moment to communicate their needs or serve their purpose. The two conceptual models share elements of effort, control, and “removing” the most central/true part or Self, from a state of being encased. In the IFS model though, each “removed” element is seen as an important aspect of the self as a whole, removing the hierarchical conception of “objectivity” and “subjectivity.” Each “subjective” element of the self is seen as serving a purpose, and can only be thanked for its service, and asked to step aside for the purposes of examining certain issues.
3. The Loss of Self
To “lose yourself” in an activity means to continue doing the activity while relinquishing conscious control of it, or ceasing “to be aware of each thing one is doing” (Lakoff, 1996, p. 104). The default state of “conscious control” is thought of as the Subject “possessing” the Self; not being in conscious control is conceptualized as “loss,” as in “I lost control.” The “loss” can have either a “positive” / “exhilarating” connotation, or a “scary” / “negative” connotation. In IFS, this concept leads into the character traits of the personified components--namely a protector taking over, particularly in negative cases in which one is “seized by anxiety” or “in the grip of fear”. These phrases represent instances of a “firefighter” coming to the forefront of consciousness. Another of Lakoff’s examples in this category is “to get carried away,” defined as “when one feels that one’s actions are being controlled by someone else, a hostile being, as when one feels possessed” (p. 104). In IFS this phrase would represent at least three roles interacting, perhaps two different protectors, a “hostile” one, the one who is (later or simultaneously) “afraid” of the hostile one, and the threatened exile that the firefighter rushed in to protect.
This is another example in which IFS elaborates our current metaphorical model to be more empowering. Rather than seeing a “loss of conscious control” as a “possession” by an external being, and all of the negative cultural references that come along with it (ie demonic possession as feared in various religious sects), we can think of our own “surprising” or “out-of-control-feeling” actions as being performed by inner parts that are usually more subconscious--parts whose motives and needs can be understood and modified by conscious attention and examination with the most neutral focused awareness (the “true self” in IFS or “The Subject” in CMT). In this way IFS can help us move away from the current binary conception of Subject vs. Self, toward a more unified image in which each emotional response (or Self), is considered a necessary part of the system. It empowers us to enact change to our subconscious patterns or responses, through compassionate awareness and a systems understanding.
The positive loss of self is currently conceptualized as “freedom from normal concerns.” This concept is mirrored in psychological theory (and also various religious practices) in the idea of a “flow state,'' named by positive psychologist Mihály Csíkszentmihályi in 1975 (Harmat, Andersen, Ullén, Wright, & Sadlo, 2018). Csíkszentmihályi describes it as “a state of complete immersion in an activity” in which “the ego falls away” and “time flies.” He compares the experience to playing jazz, in which “every...thought follows from the next one.” Crucially, he says, “you are using your skills to the utmost” and “your whole being is involved” (Cherry, 2020). Within this very statement is an implied unity of internal parts, and a conceptualization of this unity as the most optimal state of being.
Modern flow researchers have expanded on this idea, conducting studies that demonstrate the benefits of flow state across various domains including “creativity and productivity,” sports, education, social interactions, and even physiological well-being (Harmat, Andersen, Ullén, Wright, & Sadlo, 2018). This research indicates an inclination to promote inner unity as the optimal mental state in at least one other sub-section of clinical psychology--conceptually supporting the IFS focus on full-system validation and health, rather than the current western conception of promoting only the “rational” part to control the others.
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